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Religion and the Restatements 
Ian Bartrum† 
INTRODUCTION 
As Western democracies go, we are an unusually religious 
people. A recent Gallup International study on comparative 
religiosity found that 60% of Americans described themselves as 
“religious,” while the percentages were generally much lower in 
Canada, Australia, and Western Europe.1 Conversely, only five 
percent of Americans identified themselves as “atheists,” which 
places the United States among the world’s least atheistic 
nations, and on a par with Saudi Arabia.2 The underlying causes 
of our national religiosity are undoubtedly complex—and they are 
decidedly not the subjects of this paper—but it seems likely that 
our distinctive legal traditions surrounding religious freedom have 
played a significant role in shaping our cultural norms.3 France 
and Turkey, perhaps our most notable peers in the formal 
separation of church and state, rank well below the United States 
in religiosity at 37% and 23% respectively.4 This may be a result of 
French and Turkish legal traditions that are openly suspicious—
perhaps even hostile—toward organized religion, and which have 
in large part sought to insulate the state from undue clerical 
influence.5 In stark contrast, an important strain of the American 
 
 † Associate Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, UNLV. Many 
thanks to Anita Bernstein for organizing this symposium and asking me to take part. 
Thanks also to Marc DeGirolami, Rick Garnett, Leslie Griffin, Marci Hamilton, 
Michael Helfand, Paul Horwitz, Chris Lund, my fellow symposium participants, and 
the Brooklyn Law Review editors for their valuable comments and insight. 
 1 Global Index of Religion and Atheism, Winn-Gallup International (July 25, 2012) 
available at http://redcresearch.ie/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/RED-C-press-release-
Religion-and-Atheism-25-7-12.pdf. Notable exceptions included Italy (73%) and Poland (81%). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See, e.g., DENIS LACORNE, RELIGION IN AMERICA: A POLITICAL HISTORY 
(Columbia Univ. Press, 2011) (surveying various theories of American religiosity). 
 4 Global Index of Religion and Atheism, supra note 1. 
 5 See, e.g., T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and Laicite: A Comparison of 
the United States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419 (2004); Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred 
Stepan, Laïcité as an “Ideal Type” and a Continuum Comparing Turkey, France, and 
Senegal, in DEMOCRACY, ISLAM, AND SECULARISM IN TURKEY (Ahmet T. Kuru & Alfred 
Stepan, eds. 2012). 
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constitutional tradition has embraced institutional religion, and 
has endeavored to protect the church and religious prerogatives 
from the potentially tyrannical reach of civil government.6 
I open this discussion of religion and the Restatements 
with these somewhat generalized cultural observations because 
it is important to keep this uniquely American brand of 
religious liberty—what Mark DeWolfe Howe has called the 
“evangelistic” conception—firmly in mind as we think about 
first constitutional principles and the development of the 
common law.7 It is very different, in other words, to approach the 
relationship between the common law and religion from the 
perspective of the secular skeptic than it is to understand the 
civil law, generally, as incompetent or inapposite in matters of 
faith. The former approach might, for example, tend to 
understand doctrinal developments as part of a generalized 
effort to exclude religion and religious ideas from judicial 
reasoning, while the latter might emphasize the ways that the 
common law helps to create legal space for both individual 
conscience and church autonomy. Indeed, it is the coexistence 
of—and occasionally the tension between—these different 
visions that makes the American experience especially complex 
and fascinating. And, in practice, both of these theoretical 
motivations animate the development of our common law, 
sometimes even within the same opinion, and so it may be that 
a systematic effort to account for judicial decision-making in 
these terms would be both useful and timely. 
That, however, is not this article. While I have said it is 
important to keep the American evangelistic tradition in mind, 
I do not intend here to provide the blueprint for a future 
Restatement of Religious Liberty organized around competing 
first principles. In truth, as creatures of constitutional law, 
religious freedom and disestablishment are probably not the 
appropriate focus of the Restatement project. Rather, I hope 
here only to identify and clarify those instances when the 
existing Restatements already take—or I think should take—
our particular traditions of religious freedom into account: a 
map, perhaps, of the places where the common law river 
sweeps around the constitutional bedrock of religious liberty. 
With this in mind, my approach in this article is threefold. The 
first part identifies where religious freedom considerations 
 
 6 See, e.g., MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: 
RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (1967). 
 7 Id. at 7. 
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arise in the existing Restatements. The second draws attention 
to potential conflicts within and across the Restatements on 
religious freedom issues. The final part offers a few thoughts on 
places where the Restatements could, but currently do not, 
take religious freedom into detailed account. 
I. RELIGION IN THE EXISTING RESTATEMENTS 
Given the importance of religion in American life and 
the regular political controversies that arise over questions of 
religious freedom, it is perhaps surprising to discover that the 
Restatements address the topic relatively infrequently. One likely 
explanation for this circumstance is that our particular religious 
liberty presents questions of an expressly constitutional 
dimension. Thus, to the extent that the relevant principles tend to 
develop through something like common law adjudication, that 
process occurs largely in the Supreme Court—and decisions 
issuing from a single source do not cry out for the kind of detailed 
compilation and codification the American Law Institute (ALI) 
provides in other contexts. Still, this is not the entire story, 
because there are certainly complex, jurisdiction-specific 
interactions between constitutional jurisprudence and traditional 
areas of private law,8 and in these fields some organizing 
guidance is certainly welcome. It is thus hardly a surprise that it 
is at some of these intersections that religion makes its limited 
appearances in the current Restatements. Although there is 
enough extant discussion of religion to allow for an exhaustive 
accounting, I will instead attempt to make some rough 
generalizations about the common approaches the Restatements 
take to religious freedom in a variety of contexts. 
At present, the Restatements generally approach issues 
of religious freedom in one of two ways, which may roughly 
correspond with the twin constitutional guarantees of free 
exercise and disestablishment. First, in keeping with the free 
exercise clause, there are provisions that approach religious 
liberty as a matter of fundamental right, either “natural” or 
“constitutional” in nature. Second, the enigmatic promise of the 
establishment clause prompted the Restatement Reporters to 
express worry in some sections and commentary about the 
 
 8 See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012) (employment 
discrimination); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979) (property); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 
(7th Cir. 1994) (tort); In re Marriage of McSoud, 131 P.3d 1208 (Colo. 2006) (family law). 
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various entanglements that may ensnare those courts that 
attempt to adjudicate religious questions. 
A. Rights 
The Restatement of Foreign Relations provides a 
paradigmatic example of the “natural” rights approach. Section 
701 of the third edition declares that all states are “obligated to 
respect the human rights of persons subject to [their] 
jurisdiction,” including those recognized by the “general principles 
of law common to the major legal systems of the world.”9 In 
explaining the section, the Reporters’ Notes expressly refer to 
portions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including 
the recognized rights to “freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion.”10 This effort to embed religious freedom in conceptions of 
“natural” or “human” rights is certainly understandable in the 
context of international law, where positive enactments are 
relatively rare and inconsistently respected. Indeed, the 
commentary explicitly attempts to link the concepts of “natural” 
and “constitutional” rights: “The international law of human 
rights has strong antecedents in natural law, in contemporary 
moral values, and in the constitutional law of the states.”11 While 
this approach to questions of religious freedom is certainly in line 
with the constitutional promise of free exercise, it self-consciously 
reaches beyond the constitutional text and doctrine to preexisting 
moral and jurisprudential traditions. This may be a unique move 
among Restatement provisions, and it certainly reflects some of 
the difficulties that constitutional and superconstitutional norms 
may present for the Restatement project. 
The Restatement of Servitudes illustrates the fundamental 
rights approach applied, perhaps more comfortably, in the name 
of express constitutional rights. Section 3.1(2) of the third edition 
declares invalid any “servitude that unreasonably burdens a 
fundamental constitutional right.”12 The Comments identify the 
“free exercise of religion” as one of the constitutional rights that is 
sometimes claimed against servitudes, but goes on to 
acknowledge that “[c]laims that servitudes are unconstitutional 
have rarely been successful.”13 This is almost certainly because, 
as the Comments explain, the “Constitution does not ordinarily 
 
 9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 701(c) (1987). 
 10 Id. rep. note 6. 
 11 Id. cmt. b. 
 12 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000). 
 13 Id. cmt. d. 
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affect the validity of private contracts or conveyances.”14 
Nonetheless, the commentary also points out that the Supreme 
Court has recognized two circumstances in which private actions 
may be subject to constitutional limitations.15 These are the 
“traditional government function” cases derived from Marsh v. 
Alabama, and the “state entanglement” cases that flow from 
Shelley v. Kraemer.16 The former doctrine applies constitutional 
limits to private organizations that exercise authority and 
functions similar to the government, while the latter proscribes 
private agreements that rely on government enforcement 
mechanisms.17 These two exceptions to the Fourteenth 
Amendment “state action” doctrine raise at least the theoretical 
possibility that a servitude placing restrictions on religious 
practice might be found unconstitutional. In practice, however, 
such cases are more regularly (and successfully) brought under 
the Fair Housing Act, which prohibits religiously discriminatory 
servitudes.18 Still, Section 3.1 well illustrates the Restatements’ 
general approach to religion as a matter of constitutional right: 
it is a public policy issue of the highest order, which the private 
law should bend to accommodate.19 
B. Entanglements 
The second broad category of Restatement provisions 
dealing with religion seeks to avoid undue judicial entanglement 
in matters of personal or institutional religious autonomy. This 
undoubtedly arises out of an establishment clause concern that 
the adjudication of religious disputes may work to establish 
particular beliefs or institutions to the detriment of all others.20 A 
nice example of this approach appears in the Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution, Section 2.12, which declares that courts 
fashioning custodial parenting plans should not consider the 
“religious practices of a parent or the child, except to prevent 
 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)); Shelley v. Kraemer, 
334 U.S. 1 (1948). In truth, the Court has been understandably reluctant to extend the 
Shelley rationale. But see, Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (finding no cause of 
action against seller who violated racially restrictive covenant). 
 17 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1. 
 18 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619, 3631 (1988). 
 19 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY – SERVITUDES § 3.1, cmt. d. 
 20 This approach is, of course, consistent with the Court’s larger 
establishment clause jurisprudence. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 603 (1971) 
(holding that the establishment clause forbids “excessive entanglement[s]” between 
church and state institutions). 
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the child from severe and almost certain harm.”21 The 
Comments explain that: 
The issue of harm can arise when each parent wishes to expose the 
child to a different, conflicting religion. One parent may wish to limit 
the religious practices of the other parent when that parent is with 
the child, out of concern that those practices are distressing to the 
child, perhaps even inhibiting the child’s ability to develop a coherent 
religious perspective. . . . The confusion that exposure to different, even 
conflicting, religions can be expected to cause in some children is a 
harm, like many others (including any harm to children when married 
parents attempt to raise their children in two different religions), as to 
which the law is ill-equipped to save children. Taking this confusion into 
account would require courts to make comparative judgments between 
religions, which the U.S. Constitution prohibits. . . . The approach taken 
[here] reflects a realism about what courts can be expected to 
accomplish with respect to the spiritual health of children when the 
parents disagree about a child’s religious upbringing.22 
This comment captures two of the fundamental issues that 
complicate the relationship between courts and religious practice 
in a disestablished polity. First, we are concerned about the 
competence of law—and courts, particularly—to solve particular 
kinds of problems, and, second, we recognize that these same 
concerns, among others, undergird the constitutional separation 
of church from state. Indeed, a different illustration makes these 
kinds of entanglement concerns even clearer: in a situation where 
parents’ differing religious views might affect child health care 
decisions, the court should not adjudicate individual disputes, 
but rather should award sole health discretion to one parent or 
another—basically punt—to avoid intractable future conflicts.23 
In truth, of course, not every treatment of religion and 
religious freedom that appears in the existing Restatements 
fits neatly within the two approaches I have described. The 
Restatement of Unfair Competition, for example, reveals that 
some courts have contemplated whether the Church of 
Scientology can claim parts of its doctrine as a trade secret.24 But 
this odd intersection of intellectual property and religious 
freedom is undoubtedly the exception and not the rule. 
Generally, the Restatements have attempted to flesh out the 
 
 21 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12(1)(c) (2000). While 
not technically titled a “Restatement,” the ALI publishes PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION for the same purposes it does the Restatements. 
 22 Id. cmt. d. 
 23 Id. § 2.09 cmt. b, ill. 1. 
 24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 39 (1993) (citing 
Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Lone Com., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1234, 1235, 
1250-53 (N.D. Cal., 1995)). 
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constitutional protection of free exercise and disestablishment 
by treating religion either as a matter of fundamental right, or 
as presenting questions of dubious civil competence with which 
courts should avoid unnecessary entanglement. It is in organizing 
and codifying the applications of these principles in varied 
contexts that the ALI has made a valuable contribution to the 
law, and, one hopes, where its continued diligence will help 
guide us through future controversies. 
II. POTENTIAL CONFLICT ACROSS THE RESTATEMENTS 
Issues of religion and religious liberty make their most 
frequent appearances in the Restatement of Donative Transfers 
and its cousin the Restatement of Trusts. The principal reason 
for this seems to be that Americans are wont to condition trusts 
and gifts on their beneficiaries’ willingness to adhere to, or 
abstain from, certain religious principles or practices. What this 
says about the particular character of our national religiosity and 
faith is an interesting question in its own right, but one that is 
certainly beyond this article’s scope. What matters here is that 
the enforceability of such terms and conditions is a matter of some 
delicacy and increasing controversy as the Restatements (and the 
society they reflect) continue to evolve and become more diverse. 
In keeping with the fundamental rights approach 
discussed above, both the Restatement of Donative Transfers 
and Restatement of Trusts include provisions that place public 
policy limits on the kinds of restraints that donors may impose 
on beneficiaries.25 Recall that this resort to public policy concerns 
is the ALI’s sensible compromise on matters affecting the free 
exercise of religion, a settlement that acknowledges the central 
place of religious freedom in our national ethos, but concedes that 
constitutional rights do not (quite) constrain private conveyances 
and contracts.26 As with virtually all questions of public policy, 
however, the degree to which the state should act to enforce 
private religious conditions and restraints is open to reasonable 
disagreement. Indeed, the resolution of this particular question is 
a sort of zero-sum game—increased enforcement of a donor’s right 
to impose religious conditions often causes a corresponding 
decrease in the donee’s rights of free exercise. It is perhaps not 
 
 25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 (2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 5.1 (1983). 
 26 See supra, note 16 and accompanying text. 
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surprising, then, that the ALI has struggled to identify a 
consistent common law principle governing such situations. 
The Restatement of Donative Transfers addresses religious 
restraints specifically. Section 8.1 states: “An otherwise effective 
provision . . . which is designed to prevent the acquisition . . . of 
property on account of adherence to . . . certain religious beliefs or 
practices on the part of the transferee is valid.”27 Thus, in the 
context of donations or gifts, religious restraints are acceptable as 
a matter of public policy. The rationale offered in the Comment 
reveals the particular policy choices made, and demonstrates a 
decided preference for the religious freedom of the donor and a 
general disregard for the rights of the donee: 
Generally, society is not concerned with either the particular religious 
creed of the individual or the sincerity of his beliefs. The individual is 
normally free, not only to believe as he chooses, but to promote his 
theological views among others. The rule stated in this section validates 
such an attempted promotion of religious views where that promotion 
takes the form of a religious restraint annexed to a gift of property.28 
The Comment goes on to specify four particular examples 
of restraints that are generally valid: 
First, the testator may seek to enjoin his devisee from joining a 
particular order, or from entering into the ministry of a certain faith, 
without any desire to alter the adherence of that devisee to the faith 
itself. Second, and for various reasons, he may proscribe marriage 
outside the faith of the devisee. Third, the testator, having strong views 
about a particular religion, may endeavor to influence his devisee either 
to adopt or abandon that faith entirely. Fourth, the testator, opposed to 
all deistic religion, may seek to convert the devisee to atheism.29 
These examples make it clear that the law of donative 
transfers is not overly concerned with the religious freedom of 
donees. Indeed, we might think that the kind of restraints 
contemplated here would run afoul of the fundamental rights 
and public policy concerns expressed in several other fields that 
the Restatements cover, including private servitudes. 
Changes seem to be afoot, however. The more recent 
Restatement of Trusts reflects, perhaps, an evolving 
understanding of the potential harms the traditional approach 
may visit upon beneficiaries’ rights.30 As with Donative Transfers, 
Section 29 of Trusts declares invalid any provision that “is 
 
 27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 8.1 (emphasis added). 
 28 Id. cmt. a. 
 29 Id. cmt. c. 
 30 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 29 (2003). 
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contrary to public policy.”31 The explanatory comments go on to 
single out religious restraints as exactly this sort of invalid 
provision. Comment K thus provides: 
Individuals are normally free during life to promote their theological 
views among others, and to create charitable trusts during life or at 
death to support or advance a chosen religion. But the use of private 
trusts that create financial pressure regarding the future religious 
choices of beneficiaries is a different matter. A trust provision is 
ordinarily invalid if its enforcement would tend to restrain the religious 
freedom of the beneficiary by offering a financial inducement to embrace 
or reject a particular faith or set of beliefs concerning religion.32 
This approach, of course, runs counter to the earlier Section 
8.1 of Donative Transfers—and probably to many of the public 
policy explanations expressed in other Restatements—and thus 
represents, an emerging conflict across the Restatement project. 
It may be that this conflict reflects a desire to move 
beyond the traditionally separate categories of free exercise and 
disestablishment, with the older fundamental rights and 
entanglement approaches giving way to a newer distinction 
between generic and particularized conceptions of religion. Thus, 
a Reporter’s Note in the Restatement of Trusts acknowledges that 
its approach conflicts squarely with both an earlier Donative 
Transfers provision and “[m]ost of the modest number of 
American decision[s]” on point,33 but justifies this change as 
“reflect[ing] in a general way” both free exercise and 
disestablishment principles.34 In other words, the new approach 
works to protect beneficiaries’ free exercise rights, and also allays 
concerns that state enforcement of a settlor’s particular religious 
desires might violate the establishment clause. Indeed, read in a 
slightly broader context—within which Trusts disfavors 
particularized religious restraints on marriage,35 but would 
enforce charitable trusts designed to “advance religion 
generally”36—the newer approach may align with so-called 
“noncoercion” theories of disestablishment, some of which seem 
to view the establishment clause as merely proscribing a 
particularly problematic species of free exercise violation.37 That 
is to say, the newer approach attempts to protect the free 
 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. cmt. k (citations omitted). 
 33 See id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. cmt. j, Ill. 3. 
 36 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28(c) (2003). 
 37 Ian Bartrum, Salazar v. Buono: Sacred Symbolism and the Secular State, 
104 NW. U. L. REV. 1653, 1657 (2010). 
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exercise interests of both settlor and beneficiary by enforcing 
only those trust conditions that do not coerce an individual 
beneficiary into any particularized religious belief or practice. 
These last observations are just speculative, of course, 
but the underlying conflict in the ALI’s positions on donative 
transfers and trusts is quite real. This divergence is all the more 
interesting because it does not seem to be motivated by a split in 
the existing case law. Rather, the most recent edition of the 
Restatement of Trusts has taken it upon itself to revisit the 
traditional approach to trust and gift conditions, and this may 
mark the start of a larger change in philosophy about the 
principles governing a number of other areas of private law. If so, 
the shift probably embodies a more sophisticated and more 
comprehensive approach to protecting religious liberty in the 
context of private agreements, and we should welcome the 
ALI’s thoughtful efforts. 
III. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
This final part suggests a few places where the ALI might 
consider adding to its discussion of religion or religious liberty in 
future editions. In general, I do not mean to argue on behalf of a 
particular doctrinal stance or theory of church-state relations, but 
only to indicate some areas where the practice might benefit from 
some well-reasoned organization and guidance. I am agnostic, in 
other words, on the normative substance of the ALI’s position on 
various legal controversies, but would welcome more thorough 
and thoughtful descriptive efforts to guide practitioners in 
certain evolving or nuanced areas. I am aware, of course, that 
such descriptive efforts usually require substantive kinds of 
choices, and that, once published, the Restatements exert a 
significant normative force of their own. I will leave those choices 
to the ALI and its future Reporters, however, and simply point 
out a few areas that might deserve some attention. 
The first such area includes various issues perhaps best 
understood through the lens of the so-called “ministerial 
exception,” which has been in the news over the last two years.38 
The exception, which some Circuit Courts have recognized for 
nearly 40 years,39 shields religious organizations from employment 
discrimination laws in the context of “ministerial” hiring 
 
 38 E.g., Adam Liptak, Religious Groups Given Exception to Work Bias Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Jan. 12, 2012). 
 39 The seminal case is McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). 
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decisions.40 Thus, such organizations are free to discriminate 
against ministerial employees not only on the basis of religion—
which various statutory exemptions already permit41—but also on 
the basis of race, gender, and disability.42 In January 2012, the 
Supreme Court unanimously endorsed the exception in a suit 
brought by a Lutheran schoolteacher under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act.43 That case has provoked intense scholarly 
debate—some commentators suggest that it places religious groups 
“above the law,”44 while others claim it is a necessary safeguard for 
“church autonomy”45—in part because it pits fundamental 
conceptions of equal protection and religious liberty against one 
another.46 As such, the ministerial exception per se is now largely a 
creature of constitutional law—again, probably not apt subject 
matter for the Restatements—but the underlying concerns 
resonate in a number of other private tort contexts. 
Some examples we might consider are the problems that 
can arise out of tortious conduct on the part of church 
leadership or clergy members. On the one hand, principles of 
“ecclesiastical” or “charitable” immunity generally no longer 
shield church leadership or hierarchy from liability for the 
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of malfeasant clergy.47 
On the other hand, there is some ambiguity when it comes to 
“clergy malpractice”—essentially negligent counseling—a claim 
that first appeared in California in the late 1980s.48 Citing First 
Amendment concerns, courts have traditionally refused to 
impose liability under this theory, inasmuch as the underlying 
question is the substantive propriety of clerical counseling or 
guidance.49 When the alleged harm is not the substance or content 
of the advice given, however, but rather some nonreligious 
 
 40 Id. at 560-61. 
 41 See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2011). 
 42 See Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 699-701 (2012). 
 43 Id. at 706. 
 44 See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the 
Ministerial Exception from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1968 (2007); 
Leslie C. Griffin, The Sins of Hosanna-Tabor, 88 IND. L. J. 981, 1016 (2013). 
 45 See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg et al., Religious Freedom, Church-State Separation, 
and the Ministerial Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 175 (2011); Christopher C. 
Lund, In Defense of the Ministerial Exception, 90 N.C. L. REV 1, 46-48 (2011). 
 46 See Ian Bartrum, Religion and Race: The Ministerial Exception 
Reexamined, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 191 (2011). 
 47 See Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789, 1798-99 (2004) (compiling cases). 
 48 Nally v. Grace Cmty. Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 949-64 (Cal. 1988) 
(finding no liability in pastor’s failure to advise parents of child’s suicidal intentions). 
 49 John F. Wagner Jr., Cause of Action for Clergy Malpractice, 75 A.L.R. 4th 
750 §§ 2, 3, 4 (1990) (compiling cases). 
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conduct undertaken in the context of the counseling 
relationship—most typically some kind of sexual abuse or 
misconduct—courts have been increasingly willing to entertain 
tort suits,50 and several states have created statutory causes of 
action.51 This distinction has emerged at least in part from 
popular pressures following the scandals in the Roman Catholic 
Church and from the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment 
Division v. Smith and Jones v. Wolf, which have created the 
doctrinal space for courts to adjudicate neutral legal principle—
while still abstaining from disputes over the content of religious 
doctrine.52 Despite these emerging complexities, the Restatement 
of Torts gives almost no attention to “clergy malpractice”—it 
appears only in a few case notes as a non-actionable sort of 
claim.53 Some attention to the more recent distinctions and 
nuance would be welcome in future editions. 
A second area that might benefit from more discussion 
of religion and religious freedom is the emerging institution of 
same-sex marriage, which may cut across several Restatement 
contexts.54 For example, formal state recognition of same-sex 
marriage has given rise to a number of questions surrounding 
religious exemptions to state anti-discrimination laws.55 In 
contemplating these issues several years ago, I wrongly 
predicted that we would see very few suits against private 
 
 50 See id. § 4; accord Scott C. Idelman, Tort Liability, Religious Entities, and 
the Decline of Constitutional Protection, 75 IND. L. J. 219, 240, 261-62 (2000) (offering 
theoretical and institutional reasons for declining recognition of clergy immunity). 
 51 Janice D. Villiers, Clergy Malpractice Revisited: Liability for Sexual 
Misconduct in the Counseling Relationship, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1996). 
 52 See Emp’t Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) 
(finding that the free exercise clause does not shield religious actors from neutral, 
generally applicable laws); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-3, 608 (1979) (holding 
courts may apply neutral principles of law to resolve disputes within or between 
churches, so long as they do not adjudicate matters of religious doctrine). On the 
Roman Catholic Church scandal, see Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 47, at 1818. 
 53 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 16, 299A (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 874 (1979). 
 54 See generally SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: EMERGING 
CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock, Anthony R. Picarello & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 
2008). An area I do not discuss that certainly merits attention is the context of family 
dissolution, in which, as seen above, religious conflicts may present real problems. 
 55 See Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption From 
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions for Those Who 
Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 
173 (2012). Most states that recognize same-sex marriage provide statutory exemptions to 
anti-discrimination law for religious organizations (religious schools, for example, that do 
not want to provide married housing to same-sex couples). Most states, however, do not 
exempt private service providers. E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4502(l) (2009) 
(exempting religious organizations, but not others, from nondiscrimination law 
governing public accommodations). 
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business owners that refused to provide services to gay couples 
on religious grounds, but rightly (I hope) suggested that the 
common law could competently address such conflicts if they do 
arise.56 Since that time such lawsuits have been filed in several 
states, with perhaps the most notable case arising out of a New 
Mexico photographer’s refusal to document a same-sex 
ceremony.57 Both the trial and appeals courts rejected the 
photographer’s claims of First Amendment immunity, but a final 
resolution awaits in the state Supreme Court.58 Other notable 
cases have arisen in New Jersey, where a church lost its tax-
exempt status for refusing to allow same-sex weddings on a 
boardwalk open to heterosexual couples,59 and in Vermont, 
where a same-sex couple filed suit against an inn that refused to 
host their wedding.60 There is a potentially important 
distinction, however, between the New Mexico case and the 
others, in that the photographer has claimed not only a religious 
exemption to anti-discrimination law, but has also invoked free 
expression protection for the “artistic skills and creative 
processes” involved in creating wedding photographs.61 Such an 
expressive defense might also be available to florists, caterers, 
and other creative service providers, but would not seem open to 
businesses and organizations that simply provide the space or 
accommodations for couples. In any case, because I continue to 
believe that the common law is capable of handling such nuances, 
I think some effort to organize and codify the relevant principles 
would be a welcome addition to the Restatement project. 
There are, of course, several other areas that might 
deserve the ALI’s attention regarding issues of religious liberty. 
Some that have been brought to my attention include questions 
about the enforceability of arbitration decisions in religious 
conflicts,62 the application of unconscionability doctrine to 
 
 56 Ian C. Bartrum, Same-Sex Marriage in the Heartland: The Case for 
Legislative Minimalism in Crafting Religious Exemptions, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 8 (2009). 
 57 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 284 P.3d 428 (N.M. Ct. App. 2012). 
 58 Id. at 433, 445; Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 296 P.3d 491 (N.M. 
2012) (granting certiorari). 
 59 Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United Methodist Church v. Vespa-
Papaleo, 339 F. App’x. 232, 235 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 60 Kate Zezima, Couple Sues Vermont Inn for Rejecting Gay Wedding, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 20, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/20/us/ 
20vermont.html?_r=1&. 
 61 Willock, 284 P.3d at 438, 440. 
 62 On this topic, I particularly recommend, Michael A. Helfand, Religious 
Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231, 1241-42 (2011). 
592 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
contracts signed under religious duress,63 the interpretation of 
binding religious documents (perhaps as contracts), and some 
explication or codification of the kinds of “religious harms” that 
might count as damages in a variety of common law contexts. I 
will leave those discussions for other, more able, commentators, 
however, and would note only that each of these areas shares in 
at least some of the same fundamental conflicts between free 
exercise and disestablishment principles, and between communal 
and individual religious liberty. Again, this is hardly a surprise as 
these enduring contests lie at the very heart of what Marc 
DeGirolami has aptly called the “tragedy” of religious freedom.64 
CONCLUSION 
American religious liberty—with its twin promises of free 
exercise and disestablishment—is perhaps a more complex 
creature in both theory and practice than that recognized in any 
other nation. We have instituted formal legal mechanisms aimed 
at protecting both individual and group religious practice against 
state interference, and have sought also to protect the state itself 
against incursions by those groups or individuals who would bend 
its coercive power to their religious ends. These first principles 
are sometimes in tension, and there are certainly circumstances 
when judicial efforts to further one goal can actually undercut 
the other. It is precisely in these circumstances that the 
common law surrounding religious freedom becomes most 
complex and controverted, and it is thus in these areas that 
guidance from the Restatements is most welcome. 
I have attempted here to identify the current Restatements’ 
basic approaches to questions of religious freedom, and have 
suggested that—not surprisingly—those approaches seem to reflect 
our underlying first principles. The Restatements generally treat 
religion either as a matter of fundamental right, or as a subject 
matter from which courts should seek to disentangle themselves. I 
have also identified one place—the treatment of religious 
conditions in trusts as opposed to donative transfers—where the 
tension between these principles and approaches has manifested 
itself in expressly conflicting provisions. Here it seems that the 
more recent approach attempts to reconcile the religious rights of 
both parties to such transactions. Finally, I have made a few 
 
 63 Religious duress might occur when a religious organization pressures an 
individual to enter into an agreement based on the fear of God, damnation, 
excommunication, or some other form or religious consequence or punishment.  
 64 MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 55 (2013). 
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suggestions for places that future Restatements might consider 
adding some discussion of religious liberty. In particular, the 
common law surrounding clergy liability and same-sex marriage 
seems in need of clarification. 
Finally, I want to make it clear that my comments and 
suggested additions to the Restatement are in no way meant as a 
criticism of the ALI’s efforts to date. Indeed, it is the very insight 
and clarity that the Restatements have brought to so many topics 
within the common law that makes the idea of future efforts in 
these areas so appealing. Thus, in the end these suggestions might 
be just one more of those burdens that are so often thrust upon 
those who do their jobs just a little too well. 
